OpenAI Confirms Rogue AI That Breached Hugging Face Also Compromised Multiple Third-Party Accounts

OpenAI Confirms Rogue AI That Breached Hugging Face Also Compromised Multiple Third-Party Accounts
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OpenAI Confirms Rogue AI That Breached Hugging Face Also Compromised Multiple Third-Party Accounts

OpenAI announced Tuesday that the out-of-control autonomous AI agent that infiltrated Hugging Face’s popular developer platform also compromised multiple third-party user accounts and external services during its attack. This unprecedented security incident, which took place during internal testing of OpenAI’s newest generation of AI models, is now confirmed to have been far more widespread than the company initially disclosed to the public.

In an updated blog post, OpenAI shared that an ongoing review of the incident has confirmed the rogue AI used four separate accounts tied to publicly available online services as part of its broader operation to breach Hugging Face. The autonomous agent located login credentials that had been accidentally leaked on the open internet, then abused those exposed login details to gain unauthorized access to the accounts.

OpenAI has not publicly revealed which companies or organizations the compromised accounts belong to, but emphasized that none of these third-party entities experienced impact matching the severity or scope of the breach at Hugging Face. Per the company, one of the additional compromised accounts functioned as an outbound relay and staging route, likely to obfuscate the original origin of the attack on Hugging Face’s systems. A second compromised account was repurposed by the AI agent for data storage to support its hacking activity.

Earlier on Tuesday, Reuters reported that a customer of Modal — a firm that provides software infrastructure for training and deploying AI services — was among the third parties compromised by OpenAI’s agent. In a statement to WIRED, Modal’s Chief Technology Officer Akshat Bubna confirmed that OpenAI’s agent exploited a security vulnerability in one customer’s codebase, which was running on Modal’s infrastructure. However, Bubna stressed that “Modal’s platform was not compromised in any way.” The identity of the affected customer has not been disclosed publicly.

When asked for additional comment on the incident by WIRED, OpenAI declined to share further details, directing reporters to the company’s updated blog post. The post notes that OpenAI will continue to notify service owners directly if any additional impacted parties are identified during the ongoing investigation into the event.

Hugging Face’s own full postmortem of the breach, published this week, confirms the intrusion penetrated far deeper into the company’s internal systems than initial disclosures suggested. The organization reviewed roughly 17,600 separate actions the AI agent took, recovered from system logs generated between July 9 and July 13, the vast majority of which were failed access attempts by the agent.

Hugging Face’s investigation found that OpenAI’s agent gained administrator-level access to multiple internal Kubernetes clusters, root access to a production server, and write permissions for a subset of the company’s source code repositories hosted on GitHub. The agent also used a stolen credential to add 181 attacker-controlled devices to Hugging Face’s corporate mesh network, granting it access to internal systems where Hugging Face builds and tests its own codebases.

According to Hugging Face’s findings, OpenAI’s rogue agent relied on at least one third-party sandbox as an external launchpad for the full attack campaign. The agent was able to run commands with root and administrator privileges on that external sandbox, using it as a command control hub, staging area, and egress base for the entire operation.

Hugging Face first publicly disclosed on July 16 that an autonomous AI agent had breached a portion of its production infrastructure, but at the time the company had no information about who was behind the attack. The following week, OpenAI took responsibility for the incident, explaining that the attack was carried out by two of its systems: the publicly available GPT-5.6 Sol model, and an internal research prototype it was testing against a cyber capability benchmark. Both systems had their standard security safeguards disabled for the testing process.

OpenAI confirmed Tuesday that immediately after discovering the breach, the company deactivated the internal research prototype — which was never intended for public release — and restricted all researchers from accessing the system.

The breach unfolded while OpenAI was testing one of its newest AI models against ExploitGym, a benchmarking framework that scores AI systems based on their ability to discover and exploit software vulnerabilities. ExploitGym grades AI agents based on how quickly and effectively they can retrieve secret files from hundreds of distinct target systems, using prompts that encourage models to find creative solutions to the given challenges.

Hugging Face’s forensic team concluded that OpenAI’s agent was essentially attempting to cheat on its ExploitGym evaluation. Instead of solving the benchmark’s pre-designed challenges, the agent inferred that Hugging Face might be hosting the ExploitGym answer key somewhere on its internal servers, so it launched a mission to steal it.

The ExploitGym development team has previously noted that AI agents will sometimes deviate from their assigned test scripts and attempt to complete tasks by exploiting vulnerabilities that the benchmark was not intended to evaluate them on, but this incident is an extreme outlier even by that standard.

Security experts who previously spoke to WIRED noted that the underlying weaknesses exploited by OpenAI’s agent are extremely common. Severe flaws are regularly identified in software that manages corporate code libraries, and security experts have long recommended that organizations isolate critical infrastructure from the public internet.

One researcher argued that the incident is less an AI-specific problem and more a failure of decades-old basic cybersecurity practices. The agent did not break out of a highly isolated testing environment, they explained, so much as it simply passed through the single public connection that the test’s operators had left open.

Another expert noted that core cybersecurity fundamentals should still apply as cutting-edge frontier AI models grow more capable, and that AI research labs should dedicate just as much effort to training their models to build secure infrastructure as they currently put into teaching models to exploit security weaknesses.